


The Essence of Reasons

Martin Heidegger

Translated by Terrence Malick



The Essence of Reasons

A bilingual edition,
incorporating the German text
of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*

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Translator's Introduction

HEIDEGGER'S *Vom Wesen des Grundes* first appeared in a *Festschrift* for Edmund Husserl on his seventieth birthday.¹ Following a custom of *Festschrift* contributors, Heidegger used the occasion to settle a number of accounts with his former teacher. During his tenure at the University of Freiburg, Husserl had looked to Heidegger as the inheritor of both his academic chair and his investigations in the theory of knowledge. But with the publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927, it became clear that Heidegger was taking an independent stance.² Husserl's

1. "Vom Wesen . . . ," in *Ergänzungsband zum Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* (Halle, 1929), pp. 71-100.

2. Heidegger showed Husserl the rough manuscript of *Sein und Zeit*, his magnum opus, in the spring of 1926, while the two were on vacation at Todtnauberg in the Black Forest. Husserl seems not to have read far into the work; rather he asked Heidegger to edit a student's handwritten

marginalia to the book reveal something more than disappointment. At first he suspects Heidegger of innocently translating his thoughts from "phenomenological" onto "anthropological" terms—writing "Dasein" for Husserl's "ego," *das Man* for "transcendental intersubjectivity," and so forth.³ Thus many of his following comments deal with Heidegger's misinterpretation of his teachings and consequent lapse into "an intentional psychology of personal-

version of his "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins," a series of lectures which he had delivered at Göttingen in 1904–5. Heidegger agreed to undertake the task once *Sein und Zeit* had been published and his duties at the University of Marburg had terminated, that is, in the fall of 1927. The lectures were published, lightly edited and with a brief introduction, in the 1928 edition of the *Jahrbuch*, Volume IX. Except for the introduction, then, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* was Heidegger's first publication to follow *Sein und Zeit*. As such, it gives, if nothing else, a more trustworthy account of his intentions there than any of his subsequent writings, particularly since 1937, when he feels his thought took a new "turn" (*Kehre*). Cf. his footnote 59, below, p. 96.

3. In his note on page 13, Husserl remarks: "Heidegger transponiert oder transversiert die konstitutiv phänomenologische Klärung aller Regionen des Seienden und Universalen der totalen Region Welt ins Anthropologische. Die ganze Problematik ist Übertragung, dem Ego entspricht Dasein u.s.w., dabei wird alles tiefsinnig unklar und philosophisch verliert es seinen Wert." And on page 62: "Aber wie kann all das anders geklärt werden als durch meine Lehre der Intent. (Geltung) und zunächst der Erfahrenden? Was da gesagt ist ist meine eigene Lehre ohne ihre tiefere Begründung." The marginalia are preserved in the Louvain Archives under the signature "K X Heidegger I." Some have appeared in Alwin Diemer, *Edmund Husserl* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1956), p. 30, footnote. The pagination is that of the first edition of *Sein und Zeit*, published in Volume VIII of the *Jahrbuch* (Halle, 1927).

ity.”⁴ Toward the end of the book, however, Husserl decides that Heidegger is done with phenomenology—that he sees no need to define, much less to warrant, his attitudes toward the phenomena which he chooses to investigate, i.e., no need to show what recommends them to his investigation. While Husserl did not himself claim much success in defining the proper attitudes and procedures of the philosophical inquirer, he felt that philosophy could not fulfill its “Cartesian mission” and become a science until such a definition, or at least the necessity for one, had been established. He talked with Heidegger at length of his misgivings, and Heidegger promised to answer them.

Soon after the appearance of *Sein und Zeit*, Husserl was commissioned to write an article on phenomenology for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.⁵ Perhaps he saw in the article an opportunity to resolve his differences with Heidegger, for he asked him to collaborate, a rare gesture on his part. Heidegger never quite consented but, during a visit to Husserl's home in Freiburg, did work through the second

4. Husserl, on page 63: “Das ist in meinem Sinn der Weg zu einer intentionalen Psychologie der Personalität im weitesten Sinn von dem personalen Weltleben aus: ein fundierender personaler Typus.”

5. Several drafts of the *Britannica* article appear in E. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 237–301. Heidegger's revisions are included below the text of the second version; his letter appears in the Appendices, pp. 600–602. A translation of the article is reprinted from the 14th edition of the *Britannica* in R. Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960). Cf. also W. Biemel, “Husserls Encyclopaedia-Britannica Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu,” *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* (Louvain, 1950), Vol. XII.

draft. He later sent along his revisions with a covering note, which included the following observation:

We agree that being [*das Seiende*], in the sense of that which you call the "world," cannot be clarified through a return to beings of the same nature. But this does not mean that what determines the location [*Ort*] of the transcendental is not a being at all. Rather it leads directly to the *problem*: What is the nature of being in which "world" is constituted? That is the central problem of *Sein und Zeit*. . . .⁶

While, in one way, the letter is a fair statement of their differences, it is quite misleading in another. For Heidegger certainly does not think that they agree about what must be called (the) "world." That is more like the issue on which their differences rest. It is enough of an issue that Heidegger can, and in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* does, argue that "the being in which the world is constituted," or *Dasein*, is rather of *exactly* the same nature as the world it constitutes. Which is to say, at the very least, that we should not think that it is clear what "world" means and unclear what "*Dasein*" means; we can be no clearer about one than we are about the other.

Vom Wesen des Grundes, despite its title, is largely concerned with the concept of "world," and in particular with establishing the concept's lineage—a legitimate concern, since the ordinary meanings of the term and Heidegger's are only oddly akin. The "world," on his definition, is not the "totality of

6. *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, p. 601. Husserl, at least, seems to have found the statement fair. He praised the letter and recopied Heidegger's remarks in shorthand, then had them entered in a carbon copy of the manuscript.

things" but that in terms of which we understand them, that which gives them measure and purpose and validity in our schemes. What leads Heidegger to offer the definition is not obvious, but it may well be related to explaining why we must, and no less how we *can*, share certain notions about the measure and purpose and validity of things. And presumably it is important to have that explanation because sometimes we *do not*, or do not seem to, share such notions.

Where Heidegger talks about "world," he will often appear to be talking about a pervasive interpretation or point of view which we bring to the things of the world. This, in any case, has been the view of many commentators. But there is little sense in speaking of "a point of view" here since precisely what Heidegger wants to indicate with the concept is that none other is possible. And there is no more sense in speaking of an interpretation when, instead of an interpretation, the "world" is meant to be that which can keep us from seeing, or force us to see, that what we have is one. Heidegger's concept is quite like Kierkegaard's "sphere of existence" and Wittgenstein's "form of life," and, as with them, it enters his inquiry only at its limits, when a problem moves out of his depth, or jurisdiction.

There is a way in which one cannot agree with Heidegger "on certain points" any more than one can, even in a manner of speaking, be insane or revolutionary on certain points. None of his concepts, the concept of world included, can be understood until one knows how to turn all of them to account. Until then, it is confusing how one goes about understanding him or, rather, how one decides *when* one

has understood him and *whether* one has understood him as others must. Our confusion is not anarchic; it has its own discipline. We are not, for example, concerned to ask whether his remarks are true; each will be an untried example of its own truth, a truth which one does not know how to fix. Nor are we concerned to examine certain new facts of his and their implications. For, though he is telling us something that we can have failed to know, he is not claiming to give us either additional or different information; the right preface for his remarks would not be "furthermore" or "on the other hand." We have a different interest, at the outset. We want to know the kind of *advantage* that Heidegger has over us in deciding what to say about Dasein or "world," e.g., the kind of precautions we might be expected to take before challenging Heidegger's own statement on the matter and whether a *challenge* is possible in the first place. It might appear that the only terms on which we could raise a challenge, or even voice our confusion, are either outlawed or do not begin to threaten his own; we cannot speak against Heidegger's terms, while, on them, we set no limit to his advantage; our challenge, then, would serve to discredit, not Heidegger, but our understanding of him. This may or may not be true. It is put forward as an example of what would settle the question of our relationship to Heidegger. And only if we know how we stand related to him will we also know what to *make of* our confusion.

But it is not as if Heidegger did not realize all this, or did and were satisfied with himself nonetheless. He is constantly aware of how far he is from making a case; he takes pains to assess his distance

and its consequences for him. Indeed, the analysis and treatment of his failure to make a case are as internal to his work, and often as thematic,⁷ as his more obscure exercises with the notion of Dasein. Perhaps the *reasons* which he gives for his failure are wrong, but there is nothing wrong, no necessary finality, in his failure as such; or, if there is, then it is at least unclear who is in the wrong.

Our problems are problems with Heidegger's language. What gives them their force as problems is that they ask to be solved in and through his language, without further recourse. Heidegger is not, certainly by his own account, using new and peculiar words as "equivalents" for our own, and, even if he were, there is no reason to think that we would then be in some better position to understand him. Which is to say that the difficulty is not one of *decoding* him, as, we have seen, Husserl believed for a while. If Heidegger resorts to his own peculiar language, it is because ordinary German does not meet his purposes; and it does not because he has new and different purposes. If we cannot educate ourselves to his purposes, then clearly his work will look like nonsense. And yet we should not conclude that it is nonsense merely because we are not sure what is to keep us from the conclusion.

When it comes to divining Heidegger's purposes, his arguments and descriptions will not be very helpful, or will only help and fail to help in the manner of, for example, the exegesis of a religious text. They are not strictly arguments or descriptions, one sus-

7. One need only look at the Introduction to *Sein und Zeit* or the discussion of "ordinariness" (*Alltäglichkeit*) in §§ 35–38.

pects, but are designed to make such procedures, and the proper application of them, possible. They assume that we have learned where to look for their relevances—that, paradoxically, we have already gained the “horizon” which *Sein und Zeit* set out to *open* for us, namely, the “transcendental horizon of the question about Being”—and that, insofar as we have, we *necessarily* share his purposes and need not depend on his arguments.

Aside from helping the reader with the German, little is left to the translator. There are a number of more or less inevitable mistakes and inadequacies in the translation, inevitable in the sense that no gloss or paraphrase could mitigate them or could make other phrasings look like alternatives. The translator must be content with the thought that he will have succeeded, in a way, if such mistakes can become important in the first place, since the reader will be only as vulnerable to them as he is alive to Heidegger’s inventions.

Critical Notes

[1] For (*ontologische*) *Differenz* cf. Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen, 1957), pp. 46–73.

[2] The verb *wesen* is seldom used outside poetry. It means “to be,” but—with overtones of “live,” “flourish,” and “endure”—in a sense somewhat narrower and more declarative than *sein*. While Heidegger clearly writes with the poetic sense in mind, he also means to play on the cognate noun *Wesen* (“essence”); hence our translation, “. . . reveal its essence.” For a full discussion of the verb cf. Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen, 1959), p. 201.

[3] *Grund* has a wide range of meanings, most of them adequately expressed in its derivatives or in other German words: “reason,” “cause” (*Ursache*), “basis” (*Grundlage* or *Basis*), “motive” (*Beweggrund* or *Motiv*), “origin” (*Ursprung*), “foundation” (*Gründung* or *Grundlegung*). “Reason,” as in the phrase “the reason he came,” would be the best translation, except that in philosophical contexts it can too easily be understood in the sense of a faculty or mental process—a sense reserved for the word *Vernunft*. To avoid such a confusion, we have abandoned Heidegger’s singular as often as possible and, in the first two sections, have written

“reasons” for *Grund*; in the last, due to the presence of the verbs *gründen* (“ground”) and *begründen* (“found”), we have written “grounds.” Where *Grund* occurs as a prefix, for example in *Grundcharakter* and *Grundsatz*, it translates as “basic (character/principle).”

[4] *Der Satz vom Grunde*, literally “the principle of the reason,” is the German expression that Leibniz used to render the Latin, *principium rationis sufficientis*. *Satz* can, as in the following paragraph, also mean “proposition” or “sentence.”

[5] Heidegger’s choice of word is not derogatory, but a reference to Kant’s saying: “One cannot learn philosophy, rather only to philosophize.”

[6] The verb *erörtern* normally means “to discuss.” It is worth keeping in mind, however, that Heidegger often uses the term in a special sense, explained in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 37, and roughly conveyed in the expression “consider where and how something is situated” (otherwise: *den Ort von etwas beachten*).

[7] The preposition *von* can mean “from” or “of” as well as “concerning.” The clause “. . . des Bezirks, innerhalb dessen vom Wesen des Grundes gehandelt werden soll” might, then, also be translated “. . . the realm within which we should work from the essence of reasons”—not a contradictory reading, and one which we may assume Heidegger’s italics are meant to suggest.

[8] Cf. note 55, below.

[9] In *Der Satz vom Grund*, published in 1957, Heidegger expresses some misgivings about the foregoing passage (“The principle states . . . obvious to everyone”). He writes that the remarks are misleading in their implication that the principle of sufficient reason, because it is a statement about being, cannot serve as our point of departure in discussing the character of reasons:

The remarks remain correct. Nonetheless, they can lead us into error [*Irre*]. Error, on the one hand, about the avenue of approach that the principle of sufficient reason offers to the question regarding the essence of reasons, and, on the other hand, about the sensibility that inspires all thought and in whose service the book tries to place itself. What is, then, misleading? How can remarks which are quite correct nonetheless be misleading? We might answer: in a simple and therefore doubly misleading way, in a way that thought is misled quite often. . . . This treatise [*Vom Wesen des Grundes*] takes it to be self-evident that the principle, "Nothing is without a reason," states something about being but fails to shed light on what it means to be a "reason." This interpretation of the principle does not even get at what is most obvious about it. Instead it takes a step which, though almost unavoidable, is too hasty. We can characterize that step in the form of an inference: since the principle of sufficient reason is a statement about being, it gives us no information about the essence of reasons (pp. 85–86).

Heidegger thinks that the inference is wrong; throughout *Der Satz vom Grund*, he uses the principle as an expression of the understanding of "Being," and of reasons, peculiar to the stage of Western philosophy that he calls "metaphysics."

[10] The preposition *über* can mean both "over" or "above" and "about" or "concerning." Throughout the following paragraph Heidegger puns on the two senses, apparently with the thought that the principle of sufficient reason, as the most general or "most over" (*oberste*, superlative of *über*: "supreme") statement that can be made about being, is also the statement that is somehow "most about" being.

[11] Following Wolff, the "School metaphysicians" (cf. note 29, below) claimed that the principle of sufficient reason is an axiom, not of logic, but of ontology. The Kantians, notably Kieseewetter and Schultze, reversed the relationship, arguing that the School had

confused “cause” and “reason” and, to that extent, the principles of causality and sufficient reason.

[12] *Übereinstimmung* (“correspondence”) is hyphenated to indicate its kinship with *Einstimmigkeit* (“consonance”). Both words derive from the same root, *einstimmig*, meaning “unanimous” or, more literally, “of/for one voice (*Stimme*).”

[13] Heidegger states that something is “ontic” if it has to do with “being” (*Seiendes*), ontological if it has to do with “Being” (*Sein*) or Dasein’s understanding of Being.

[14] “Factical” (*faktisch*) means “contingent” in the sense that only Dasein can be said to be “contingent.” When Heidegger is discussing the “contingency” of objects, he writes *tatsächlich*. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, §§ 38–41.

[15] The term “unconcealedness” (*Unverborgenheit*) is introduced in *Sein und Zeit*, § 44. For its meanings in Heidegger’s work since 1929 cf. *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen, 1954), pp. 247–59, and *Holzwege* (Frankfurt, 1950), pp. 25–68.

[16] The foregoing remarks are directed at Nicolai Hartmann’s *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (Berlin, 1921). When Heidegger talks of the “reality of the external world” in the following sentence, he is probably referring to Wilhelm Dilthey’s “Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Aussenwelt und seinem Recht,” in his *Gesammelte Schriften* (Leipzig, 1921–35), Volume V, Part I. Both texts were criticized in similar terms in *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 205 (footnote) and 208 (footnote).

[17] Husserl wrote that certain aspects of every conscious experience are “intentional” in the sense that they “constitute” (*konstituieren*) or “give meaning to” the object(s) of the experience. Heidegger’s comment here is more fully elaborated in his letter to Husserl regarding the latter’s *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article:

“. . . daß die Existenzverfassung des Daseins die transzendente Konstitution alles Positiven ermöglicht . . . ,” etc. The letter is printed in an appendix to Husserl’s *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 600 ff.

[18] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 154, B 193.

[19] Like Kant, Heidegger wants something more from the word *überhaupt* than the ordinary German sense of “in general,” with its unwelcome implication of “on the average.” Where the word translates into English at all, one might best read: “at an ontological/transcendental level.”

[20] The relationship is the subject of Husserl’s *Formale und transzendente Logik*, published in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1929, a few months before the first edition of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*.

[21] To avoid a neologism, we have written “surpassing” for both the common noun, *Überstieg*, and the less frequent gerund, *Übersteigen*. Both derive from the verb *übersteigen*, which in ordinary German, and a few times in the above passage, means “to step over” or “cross.”

[22] Heidegger cannot, of course, agree with the views expressed in the foregoing paragraph, or indeed throughout much of the following section. In German, when one has reservations about what one is saying, one normally uses the subjunctive. Heidegger, however, seldom does, and his indicatives should not lead the reader, as they often have commentators, into attributing to him the very positions that he wishes to criticize.

[23] This is the only point at which Heidegger uses, and our “constitute” translates, Husserl’s term *konstituieren*. Elsewhere “constitute” and “constitution” render the verb *ausmachen* (sometimes: “make up”) and the noun *Verfassung* (“makeup”).

[24] Heidegger’s most succinct definition of “Da-

sein" is "the basic mode of the Being of man." He divides the term with a hyphen here to develop its root meaning, "Being . . . there," which he unfolds in *Sein und Zeit*, § 3: "Das Da-sein hat sein Da zu sein. Weil das Wesen des Daseins darin liegt, daß es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein hat, ist der Titel Dasein als reiner Seinsausdruck zur Bezeichnung dieses Seienden (Mensch) gewählt."

[25] Husserl distinguished two epistemological standpoints: the "natural," or "dogmatic," and the "transcendental." The former has as its "correlate" the "natural world," to justify our knowledge of which we suspend the natural and thus reach the transcendental standpoint. From here we survey "the whole field of absolute consciousness," within which the natural world is constituted and our knowledge of it grounded. Cf. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (The Hague, 1950), Book One, §§ 27, 50, 62.

[26] Husserl defines *Transzendenz* as the necessarily incomplete "manner of givenness" (*Gegebenheitsart*) of things in the natural world. Cf. his *Ideen*, Book One, § 42: "Zum Ding als solchem. . . ." However, he often uses the term for the natural world itself, and it is this usage that Heidegger is scrutinizing.

[27] "Region" (*Region*) is a Husserlian term, roughly synonymous with "class" in ordinary philosophical usage; its strictly phenomenological meaning is defined in *Ideen*, Book One, § 16.

[28] On Heidegger's definition, something is *existenzial* if it pertains to the ontological features of Dasein, and *existenziell*, on the other hand, if it pertains to Dasein's ontic features or affairs, i.e., to Dasein's affairs prior to the clarification of its ontological structure. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, § 4.

[29] *Schulmetaphysik* is a popular name for the school of Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Its adherents,

among them Crusius and Baumgarten, sought to codify the philosophy of Leibniz in "geometrical fashion," deducing his conclusions from irrefutable axioms and definitions, then enlarging them in corollaries and scholia.

[30] *Kennen* and *erkennen*, like the French *connaître* and *savoir*, both mean "to know," *kennen* in the sense of "be acquainted with" (*connaître*) and *erkennen* in the sense of "know for certain that" (*savoir*). Their cognate nouns, *Kenntnis* and *Erkenntnis*, we have translated as "knowledge about" and "knowledge of."

[31] Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, §§ 53–58. The word "being" functions strictly as a present participle in the phrase "potentiality for being" and should not be confused with the gerund *Seiendes*.

[32] The criticisms are made of Max Scheler. Cf. his *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, ed. Maria Scheler (4th ed.; Bern, 1954), pp. 308 ff.

[33] Heidegger asks the same question in *Sein und Zeit*, p. 64, and later on (p. 366) answers, much less ambiguously than in the present volume: "Wenn das 'Subjekt' ontologisch als existierendes Dasein begriffen wird, dessen Sein in der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann muß gesagt werden: Welt ist 'subjektiv.' Diese 'subjektive' Welt aber ist dann als zeitlich-transzendente 'objektiver' als jedes mögliche 'Objekt.'"

[34] The verb *bilden* can mean "to form" in a number of senses: "to fashion" or "create," "to be" or "compose," and, intransitively, with the reflexive *sich*, "to arise" or "develop." Heidegger gives no clue as to which sense should prevail here. The noun *Bild* means: "picture," "image," "likeness," "representation," and only seldom "form." *Vorbild* normally means "pattern" or "model," but Heidegger has inserted a hyphen to bring alive its root meaning of "pre/proto-picture." Cf. Heidegger's excursus on the terms in "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in *Holzwege*, pp. 82 ff.

[35] In everyday usage, and in the last paragraph of the present volume, the verb *zeitigen* means "to mature" or "give rise to." Yet in Heidegger it generally stands for something like "make temporal through incorporation into the projects of Dasein." Cf. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 213: "Zeitigen heißt. . . ."

[36] Kierkegaard used the term "secret" as a metaphor for the "pure inwardness" of the believer's relationship to the Eternal or "Transcendent." The nature of the relationship is like a secret in the sense that it cannot be told, or rather, can only be compromised in the telling. It must instead be communicated in "indirect discourse," or "maieutics," and even "maieutics" is inadequate, Kierkegaard writes in his *Journals*, since it can merely teach us when the relationship is improper. For "indirect communication" cf. his *Training in Christianity* (London, 1941), pp. 132-43.

[37] The phrase is one that Socrates uses in the *Theaetetus*, 189-90, while explaining what he means by "conceiving." When Heidegger writes that "the tendency to construe the Ideas as innate in the subject" was prefigured in Plato, he is doubtless referring to Socrates' digression on the matter a few pages later (192 ff.).

[38] *Vernunft* means "reason" in the sense of a faculty or mental process or ideal, a sense that the term never shares with *Grund*. It derives from the verb *vernehmen*, "to perceive," which it follows here. Heidegger seldom uses the term himself; his quotation marks indicate that Kant's notion of "reason" is under examination.

[39] Certain critics, in reviewing *Sein und Zeit*, suggested that Heidegger was following Karl Barth and Emil Brunner in giving the same weight to the "transcendence of Being" that the two theologians gave to the "transcendence of revelation."

[40] As mentioned above, Husserl often cautioned

Heidegger against working from an "anthropological" or "anthropocentric" standpoint, a standpoint that is "still dogmatic" in that it has not been clarified in the transcendental reduction. For an elaboration of his cautionings cf. his 1931 Berlin lecture, published as "Philosophy and Anthropology" in R. Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (Glen-coe, 1960).

[41] Though Husserl never, to our knowledge, uses the term *Standpunktsfreiheit*, he sometimes mentions that the transcendental reduction (epochē) frees the pure ego from any particular point of view and leaves the field of consciousness "anonymous," making a scientific inquiry about its contents possible. Cf., for example, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague, 1962), p. 188: ". . . die ganze Scheidung und Ordnung der Personalpronomina ist in meiner Epoche zum Phänomen geworden, mitsamt dem Vorzug des Ich-Mensch unter anderen Menschen. . . ."

[42] *Umwillen* ("for the sake of . . .") is a preposition that Heidegger often uses as a technical noun. It is discussed in *Sein und Zeit*, §§ 18, 41. The component *willen* corresponds to "sake" in the English and, as in English, cannot be used outside a prepositional phrase, e.g., *um Gottes willen* ("for God's sake") or *meinerwillen* ("for my sake"). Heidegger, in the following sentences, puns on its etymological kinship with *Wille*, or "will." We might, then, paraphrase the passage as follows: if "world" is understood as the totality of what exists "for the sake of" Dasein, i.e., for its own peculiar uses, then Dasein's "sake" (*Wille*) can be said to create, or fashion, the uses in terms of which it deals with the world.

[43] Throughout the following passage, Heidegger juxtaposes different verbs with the component *werfen* ("throw"): *entwerfen* ("project" or "throw off"), *überwerfen* ("throw over"), and *vorwerfen* ("reproach" or

“throw forth/to”). *Entwurf*, the cognate noun of *entwerfen*, follows closely the sense and etymology of the English “project.” Yet in ordinary German it can, and in Heidegger often does, mean either “sketch” or “outline,” or—in the sense that a statistician or geometer, but not a psychologist, might use the word—“projection.”

[44] Heidegger makes a transitive verb of *Welt* (“world”), as he did earlier with *Nichts* (“nothing”), evidently to encourage the reader to think of *Welt* and *Nichts* as existing, or functioning, in a way so peculiarly their own that it can only be expressed tautologically.

[45] The criterion is Kant’s. Cf. his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 533, B 561, where freedom is defined as “das Vermögen, einen Zustand *von selbst* anzufangen, dessen Kausalität also nicht nach dem Naturgesetze wiederum unter einer anderen Ursache steht, welche sie der Zeit nach bestimmte.” Also A 445, B 473: “Die Freiheit . . . als eine besondere Art von Kausalität.”

[46] *Stiften* means “to found” or “establish” in the sense that one establishes, not a fact, but an institution.

[47] *Boden nehmen* is a rare variation of *Boden fassen*. *Boden* normally means “floor” or “earth,” though it has many of the same connotations as *Grund*, as in the phrases *auf dem Boden der Erfahrung* (“on the basis of experience”) or *zurück auf den rauhen Boden* (“back to rough ground”).

[48] *Eingenommen (von)* shares with *gestimmt (für)* the implication of “inclined in favor of” or “infatuated with.”

[49] *Entgegenbringen* can also mean “to offer,” so that the sentence might instead read: “. . . it offers the ‘actually’ realizable possibilities of the project of world to Dasein as its world.”

[50] The reference is to Husserl. Like the earlier discussion of intentionality, the following pages seem to fulfill a promise made in a footnote in *Sein und Zeit*, p. 363, which reads: “Daß und wie die Intentionalität

des 'Bewußtseins' in der ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit *gründet* [the word is italicized only in recent editions], wird der folgende Abschnitt zeigen." One must assume, not unfairly, that *Vom Wesen des Grundes* originally formed part of the never published Third Division ("Zeit und Sein") of *Sein und Zeit*, Part One.

[51] The word in parentheses, "truth," refers to the whole phrase, "kind of disclosure" (*Enthüllungsart*).

[52] Cf. note 36, above.

[53] *Sorge*, or "care," is a technical term for "the Being of Dasein" that Heidegger discusses in *Sein und Zeit*, §§ 26, 41, 65. *Bestand* and *Beständigkeit* have many of the same equivalents: "continuance," "duration," "permanence," "stability," etc. Both derive from the verb *bestehen*, which means "to exist," with overtones of "continue" and "endure."

[54] For Leibniz' various statements of the principle of sufficient reason cf. his "Fifth Letter to Clark," § 125, and *Theodicée*, § 44; also the *Monadologie*, §§ 31-32, where it is associated with the principles of identity and contradiction, an association that Heidegger will shortly dispute.

[55] *Unwesen* has a loose range of meanings: "disorder," "abuse," "confusion," "nuisance," "mischief." The idiom *Unwesen treiben*, which Heidegger employs for the second time here, means "to be up to one's tricks" or "to play mischief with"; since the idiom is less colloquial in German, we have sought a compromise in "breeds confusion." The word's two components, "non" (*un*) and "essence" (*Wesen*), suggest the translation "(have) no essence" when, in the following paragraph, Heidegger enters a hyphen between them.

[56] In the second version of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article, the same which Heidegger edited, Husserl wrote that traditional philosophers had remained at a level of "undefined generality and emptiness" to the extent that they had failed to undertake the

transcendental reduction, the new and "radical departure" that would allow us to secure our knowledge of the natural world. Cf. his *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, pp. 256 f.

[57] "Iteration" is a term from Husserl. It is described in the first book of the *Ideen*, § 112, as an operation which permits one to distinguish fantasy and reflection from perception. If an experience can be "iterated," it can become, *ad infinitum*, the object of another experience of the same kind. We can have fantasies about fantasies, but not perceptions of perceptions, etc. Heidegger's thought seems to be that freedom—as that on the basis of which "reasons" become possible, as *der Grund des Grundes*,—does not in turn have, but it, its own reason.

[58] *Abgrund* commonly means "abyss" or "precipice," but Heidegger hyphenates its components here to bring its root meaning, "non/off-ground," into play. As the *Abgrund* of Dasein, freedom is that to which Dasein looks, and beyond which it cannot look, in search of reasons or causes.